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Brewster: Piercing the Corporate Veil

COMMENTS

PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL IN MONTANA
Jody J. Brewster
[Ilt is essential to a clear understanding of the . . . law of corporations to bear in mind distinctly that the existence of a corporation independently of its shareholders is a fiction; and that the
rights and duties of an incorporated association are in reality the
rights and duties of the persons who compose it, and not of an
imaginary being.1
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INTRODUCTION

This comment presents the doctrine of piercing the corporate
veil as it exists in Montana. An examination of applicable Montana
cases illustrates the theories and factors relied upon by the Montana Supreme Court in deciding whether to pierce a corporate veil.
-Finally, the comment discusses the court's confusion of corporate
veil law with agency law and the modification of the doctrine that
1. Scott v. Prescott, 69 Mont. 540, 557, 223 P. 490, 495 (1924) (quoting 1 V.
MORAWETZ, THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 1 (2d ed. 1886).
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has resulted from that confusion.
II.

DEFINITION OF "PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL"

As a general rule, the corporation is treated as a legal entity,
separate and distinct from its shareholders.2 The corporation alone
is held accountable for its acts. The shareholders are thus able to
invest money in the corporation with the assurance that their personal liability for acts of the corporation will be limited to the
amount paid for their stock.3 In other words, the corporate shareholder enjoys limited liability.
Under exceptional circumstances, however, the protection of
limited liability may be lost because of some wrongdoing in the
operation of the corporation. In such cases, the courts may exercise
their equitable powers to "disregard the corporate entity" or
"pierce the corporate veil."
"Piercing the corporate veil" is a term that describes a court's
willingness to ignore, for purposes of a particular transaction, the
fact that a corporation exists as an entity separate from those who
own it. 4 This willingness does not depend upon a finding that the
corporation was defectively formed. 5 Instead, it results from a policy determination to impose the legal consequences of a corporate
act directly upon the shareholders of the corporation.' In the interests of justice, the court will look behind the corporate fiction, not
to question the corporation's existence 7 nor to question its right to
2. State ex rel. Monarch Fire Ins. Co. v. Holmes, 113 Mont. 303, 308, 124 P.2d 994,
996 (1942); cf. State v. Holdren, 143 Mont. 103, 112, 387 P.2d 446, 451 (1963); Brady Irrigation Co. v. Teton County, 107 Mont. 330, 334, 85 P.2d 350, 352 (1938); Russell v. Russell,
102 Mont. 301, 308, 59 P.2d 777, 780 (1936); Barnes v. Smith, 48 Mont. 309, 316, 137 P. 541,
543 (1913).
3. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-510(1) (1981) provides as follows:
(1) A holder of or subscriber to shares of a corporation shall be under no
obligation to the corporation or its creditors with respect to such shares other
than the obligation to pay to the corporation the full consideration for which such
shares were issued or to be issued.
4. L. SODERQUIST, CORPORATIONS-A PROBLEM APPROACH 239 (1979).
5. Id. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-204 (1981) provides that a corporation's existence begins only upon the issuance of the certificate of incorporation. Furthermore, the certificate
is conclusive evidence that the incorporation was not done so defectively. Thus, to impose
liability upon the alleged shareholders of a defectively formed corporation, a court need not
pierce the corporate veil; the court need only hold that, because no certificate was ever
issued, no corporation ever came into existence. The alleged shareholders would be liable
under MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-109 (1981), which provides that "[aill persons who assume
to act as a corporation without the authority so to do [sic] shall be . . . liable for all debts
and liabilities incurred."

6.

L. SODERQUIST,

CORPORATIONs-A PROBLEM APPROACH

239 (1979); see also Hansen

Sheep Co. v. Farmers' & Traders' State Bank, 53 Mont. 324, 337, 163 P. 1151, 1155 (1917).
7. Once the Secretary of State has issued the certificate of incorporation, the corpor-
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exercise corporate powers,8 but rather to ascertain the identity of
the persons who use the name of the corporation for their own purposes.9 If the court finds that the shareholders, and not the corporation, are the real parties in interest, then liability for the ostensible corporate acts will be fixed upon the shareholders.' 0
The doctrine of piercing the corporate veil is an equitable
remedy that involves the balancing of two strong, competing policies: 1 the need to foster the growth of corporate business 2 and the
need to curb the injustice that can result from improper uses of
the corporate device. Since the doctrine is an equitable one, there
is no general formula to fit all cases. Rather, the conditions under
which a corporate entity will be disregarded vary according to the
circumstances of each case.'
III.

THE PRIMA FACIE CASE

A summary of Montana case law demonstrates that two factors must be shown to exist before a corporate veil will be pierced:
first, it must be shown that the corporation is the mere agent or
alter ego of the shareholders; and second, it must be shown that
piercing the veil is necessary to prevent fraud or to achieve
4
equity.'
A.

The Corporation Is the Mere Agent or Alter Ego
of the Shareholders

The Montana court has recognized two general theories under
which the corporate entity may be disregarded: the "agency" theory and the "alter ego" or "identity" theory.1
tion is protected from all challenges to its existence except for direct attacks by the state in
the form of a quo warranto proceeding to cancel or revoke the certificate. MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 35-1-204 (1981).
8. Dunham v. Natural Bridge Ranch Co., 115 Mont. 579, 583, 147 P.2d 902, 904 (1944).
9. Hansen Sheep Co. v. Farmers' & Traders' State Bank, 53 Mont. 324, 337, 163 P.
1151, 1155 (1917).
10. Id.
11. Note, Disregardof the Corporate Entity, 4 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 335 (1978).
12. The corporate style of doing business was created by the legislature "to encourage
trade and industry by enabling natural persons to make profitable investment by availing
themselves of the skill, experience, and personal fitness of others, without incurring personal
liability for the obligations incurred in the management of the business of the corporation."
Barnes v. Smith, 48 Mont. 309, 316, 137 P. 541, 543 (1913).
13. See generally State ex rel. Monarch Fire Ins. Co. v. Holmes, 113 Mont. 303, 307,
124 P.2d 994, 996 (1942).
14. Flemmer v. Ming, - Mont. -, 621 P.2d 1038, 1042 (1980); State ex rel. Monarch
Fire Ins. Co. v. Holmes, 113 Mont. 303, 308, 124 P.2d 994, 996 (1942).
15. Flemmer v. Ming, - Mont. -, 621 P.2d 1038, 1042 (1980); State ex rel. Monarch
Fire Ins. Co. v. Holmes, 113 Mont. 303, 307, 124 P.2d 994, 996 (1942).
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1. Agency Theory
Under the agency theory, the court will disregard a corporation's separate identity where the corporation acted"6 as the mere
agent of its shareholders for the particular transaction in issue.17 In
applying the agency theory, traditional rules of agency govern the
court's analysis."8 Usually, the most important element in ascertaining the existence of an agency relationship is the presence of
control by the principal over the conduct and activities of the
agent.' 9 Although the Montana court has recognized the agency
theory, the court has never applied the agency theory to pierce a
corporate veil.
2.

Alter Ego or Identity Theory

Under the "alter ego" or "identity" theory, the court will disregard a corporation's separate identity where the corporation is so
identified with the shareholders as to make the corporation and its
shareholders into one.2 0 Neither ownership of stock nor control of
management is generally sufficient by itself to justify invoking the
alter ego or identity theory.2 Rather, actual shareholder domination of corporate affairs must be so pervasive that the shareholders
and the corporation no longer have separate identities.2 2 In effect,
the corporation is merely the name under which the shareholders
16. To invoke the agency theory, the act giving rise to the action must be the act of
the agent corporation, and not the act of the shareholders. State ex rel. Monarch Fire Ins.
Co. v. Holmes, 113 Mont. 303, 308, 124 P.2d 994, 996 (1942).
17. Flemmer v. Ming, - Mont. -, 621 P.2d 1038, 1042 (1980); State ex rel. Monarch
Fire Ins. Co. v. Holmes, 113 Mont. 303, 307, 124 P.2d 994, 996 (1942).
18. The agency theory of piercing the corporate veil, where the corporation acts as the
agent of the shareholders, must be distinguished from the situation where corporate agents,
such as directors, officers, or employees, perform acts on behalf of the corporation. In the
former case the corporation is the agent; in the latter case the corporation is the principal.
For a discussion of the Montana Supreme Court's confusion of the agency theory of corporate veil law with agency law, see infra section V of text.
19. State v. Holdren, 143 Mont. 103, 110-11, 387 P.2d 446, 450 (1963).
20. Flemmer v. Ming, - Mont. -, 621 P.2d 1038, 1042 (1980); State ex rel. Monarch
Fire Ins. Co. v. Holmes, 113 Mont. 303, 307, 124 P.2d 994, 996 (1942).
21. State ex rel. Monarch Fire Ins. Co. v. Holmes, 113 Mont. 303, 308-09, 124 P.2d
994, 996 (1942); Gallatin Natural Gas Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 79 Mont. 269, 289, 256
P. 373, 379 (1927). Contra Stromberg v. Seaton Ranch Co., 160 Mont. 293, 309, 502 P.2d 41,
49-50 (1972) (where the court held that the shareholder's ownership of 100% of the corporation's stock was sufficient to justify a finding that the corporation was the alter ego of the
shareholder).
22. Wilson v. Milner Hotels, Inc., 116 Mont. 424, 433, 154 P.2d 265, 269 (1944); Commercial Credit Co. v. O'Brien, 115 Mont. 199, 211, 146 P.2d 637, 642 (1944); State ex rel.
Monarch Fire Ins. Co. v. Holmes, 113 Mont. 303, 308, 124 P.2d 994, 996 (1942); Gallatin
Natural Gas Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 79 Mont. 269, 287, 256 P. 373, 378 (1927).
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do business.2
Although the same principles for piercing the corporate veil
apply whether the corporation has one or many shareholders, the
facts necessary for the application of such principles are most frequently encountered in cases of closely-held, family corporations2 4
and parent-subsidiary corporations.2
A summary of Montana case law identifies a number of factors
upon which the court has relied in deciding whether to pierce a
corporate veil. Although no single factor or set of factors is determinative, a variety of combinations of the following factors may
indicate that the corporation is the alter ego of its controlling
shareholder(s):
1. Shareholder owns all26 or most2 7 of the corporation's
28
stock.
23. Russell v. Russell, 102 Mont. 301, 305, 59 P.2d 777, 779 (1936); Gallatin Natural
Gas Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 79 Mont. 269, 282, 256 P. 373, 376 (1927); Scott v. Prescott, 69 Mont. 540, 561, 223 P. 490, 497; United States Gypsum Co. v. Mackey Wall Plaster
Co., 60 Mont. 132, 143, 199 P. 249, 251 (1921); Hansen Sheep Co. v. Farmers' & Traders'
State Bank, 53 Mont. 324, 336, 163 P. 1151, 1154 (1917); State v. Hall, 45 Mont. 498, 518,
125 P. 639, 648 (1912); ct State ex rel. Monarch Fire Ins. Co. v. Holmes, 113 Mont. 303, 308,
124 P.2d 994, 996 (1942).
24. Ownership of all or most of a corporation's stock by a family does not generally by
itself afford sufficient grounds for disregarding the corporate entity. E.g., Flemmer v. Ming,
- Mont. -, 621 P.2d 1038, 1042 (1980). However, the closely-held, family corporation concentrates control and knowledge in the principle shareholder(s) and thereby readily lends
itself to illegitimate use.
25. Generally speaking, the corporate veil principles governing corporations owned by
individuals are also applicable to corporations owned entirely by another corporation. See
State ex rel. Monarch Fire Ins. Co. v. Holmes, 113 Mont. 303, 308, 124 P.2d 994, 996 (1942);
Gallatin Natural Gas Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 79 Mont. 269, 287, 256 P. 373, 378
(1927).
26. See Stromberg v. Seaton Ranch Co., 160 Mont. 293, 309, 502 P.2d 44, 49-50 (1972);
Wilson v. Milner Hotels, Inc., 116 Mont. 424, 428, 154 P.2d 265, 267 (1944); Commercial
Credit Co. v. O'Brien, 115 Mont. 199, 203, 146 P.2d 637, 639; State ex rel. Foot v. Farmers'
& Mechanics' State Bank of Helena, 85 Mont. 256, 259, 278 P. 828, 829 (1929); Barnes v.
Smith, 48 Mont. 309, 319, 137 P. 541, 544 (1913).
27. See e.g., Russell v. Russell, 102 Mont. 301, 305, 59 P.2d 777, 778-79 (1936); Gallatin Natural Gas Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 79 Mont. 269, 280, 256 P. 373, 376; Scott v.
Prescott, 69 Mont. 540, 551, 223 P. 490, 493 (1940). In each of these cases, the controlling
shareholder owned all but a small minority of the shares-in Russell, the controlling shareholder owned all but ten out of 20,000 outstanding shares; in Gallatin, all but five out of
2500 shares; and in Scott, all but two out of 7200 shares. It is apparent from the facts of the
cases, that the only reason that the controlling shareholder did not own 100% of the stock
was the necessity of complying with the then existing statute, MONT. REV. CODES Ann. §
5933 (1921), that required every corporation to have at least three directors, each of whom
was also a shareholder.
28. By implication, the Montana court appears to apply a family attribution rule in
corporate veil cases. Thus, a shareholder who in fact owns less than a majority of the stock
is treated as owning all of the stock held by members of his family in addition to his own
stock. See, e.g., Flemmer v. Ming, - Mont. -, 621 P.2d 1038, 1042 (1980); State v. Holdren,
143 Mont. 103, 104, 387 P.2d 446, 447 (1963); Shaffer v. Buxbaum, 137 Mont. 397, 399, 352
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2. Shareholder is a director and/or the president of the
corporation.29
3. Shareholder makes all corporate decisions without consulting the other directors or officers.30
4. Shareholder, officers and/or directors fail to comply with
the statutory requirements regarding operation of the
corporation.3 1
5. Shareholder's personal funds are commingled with the cor32
poration's funds.

6. Shareholder's personal credit and corporation's credit are
used interchangeably to obtain personal and corporate loans. 3
7. Shareholder's personal business records are not kept separate from corporation's business records.3 "
8. Shareholder and corporation engage in same type of
business.35
P.2d 83, 84 (1960); United States Gypsum Co. v. Mackey Wall Plaster Co., 60 Mont. 132,
133, 199 P. 249, 250 (1921); Hansen Sheep Co. v. Farmers' & Traders' State Bank, 53 Mont.
324, 331, 163 P. 1151, 1152 (1917).
29. See Flemmer v. Ming, - Mont. -, 621 P.2d 1038, 1040 (1980); State v. Holdren,
143 Mont. 103, 105, 387 P.2d 446, 447 (1963); United States Gypsum Co. v. Mackey Wall
Plaster Co., 60 Mont. 132, 139, 199 P. 249, 251; Hansen Sheep Co. v. Farmers' & Traders'
State Bank, 53 Mont. 324, 331, 163 P. 1151, 1152; State v. Hall, 45 Mont. 498, 502, 125 P.
639, 642 (1912). But see Sun River Stock & Land Co. v. Montana Trust & Savings Bank, 81
Mont. 222, 228, 262 P. 1039, 1041 (1928) (where the court declined to pierce a corporate veil
despite the fact that the individual shareholders were also the officers and directors of the
corporation).
30. See Hansen Sheep Co. v. Farmers' & Traders' State Bank, 53 Mont. 324, 335, 163
P. 1151, 1154 (1917).
31. Failure to issue stock: See State ex rel. Foot v. Farmers' & Mechanics' State Bank
of Helena, 85 Mont. 256, 259, 278 P. 828, 829 (1929); failure to hold meetings of the shareholders and/or directors: see Scott v. Prescott, 69 Mont. 540, 552-53, 223 P. 490, 494 (1924)
and Hansen Sheep Co. v. Farmers' & Traders' State Bank, 53 Mont. 324, 331, 163 P. 1151,
1153 (1917); and failure to file annual reports: see Shaffer v. Buxbaum, 137 Mont. 397, 399,
352 P.2d 83, 84 (1960). Sound policy considerations support piercing the corporate veil
where the controlling shareholder ignores the rules of corporate behavior: where the controlling shareholder does not acknowledge the separate existence of the corporation in day-today operations, he should not be permitted to assert that separate existence when he is
being held personally liable for ostensible acts of the corporation.
32. See State v. Holdren, 143 Mont. 103, 105, 387 P.2d 446, 447 (1963); Shaffer v.
Buxbaum, 137 Mont. 397, 399, 352 P.2d 83, 84 (1960); Wilson v. Milner Hotels, Inc., 116
Mont. 424, 432, 154 P.2d 265, 269 (1944); Scott v. Prescott, 69 Mont. 540, 553, 223 P. 490,
494 (1924); Hansen Sheep Co. v. Farmers' & Traders' State Bank, 53 Mont. 324, 333, 163 P.
1151, 1153 (1917); State v. Hall, 45 Mont. 498, 506, 125 P. 639, 643 (1912).
.33. See Russell v. Russell, 102 Mont. 301, 305-06, 59 P.2d 777, 779 (1936); Hansen
Sheep Co. v. Farmers' & Traders' State Bank, 53 Mont. 324, 332, 163 P. 1151, 1153 (1917).
34. See Scott v. Prescott, 69 Mont. 540, 553, 223 P. 490, 494 (1924).
35. See Flemmer v. Ming, - Mont. -, 621 P.2d 1038, 1042 (1980); Commercial Credit
Co. v. O'Brien, 115 Mont. 199, 203, 146 P.2d 637, 639 (1944); Gallatin Natural Gas Co. v.
Public Service Comm'n, 79 Mont. 269, 276, 256 P. 373, 374 (1927). But see Sun River Stock
& Land Co. v. Montanta Trust & Savings Bank, 81 Mont. 222, 226, 262 P. 1039, 1041 (1928)
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9. Shareholder and corporation have same address which is
the address of shareholder's personal residence.36
10. Shareholder admits to third parties that the shareholder
and the corporation are one and the same. 37
11. Corporation's profits and earnings are distributed through
means other than dividends.38
12. Corporation is undercapitalized. 9
If a parent-subsidiary relationship is involved, the following
additional factors may indicate that the subsidiary corporation is
the mere alter ego of its parent corporation:
13. Parent and subsidiary have same name.4 °
14. Parent and subsidiary have same directors and officers. 41
Mechanical avoidance of the foregoing factors will not insure
that the court will not pierce a corporate veil. Even the most stringent efforts to comply with the checklist will not protect a corporation where it is being used fraudulently or illegally.
B. Piercing the Corporate Veil Is Necessary
to Prevent Fraud or to Achieve Equity
1. Fraudulent and Illegal Uses of Corporations
If the court finds that the corporation is a mere agent or alter
ego of the dominant shareholder, the next issue is whether the
shareholder has used his domination or control for fraud or some
other illegal purpose."' Proving such facts places a heavy burden
upon the party who advocates piercing the corporate veil. At the
same time, this requirement fosters the corporate style of doing
business by insuring that the corporate veil will be pierced only
under extreme circumstances. For example, the Montana court has
(where the court declined to pierce a corporate veil despite the fact that the corporation and

the shareholders were engaged in the same business).
36. See Flemmer v. Ming, - Mont. -, 621 P.2d 1038, 1042 (1980); Shaffer v. Buxbaum,
137 Mont. 397, 401, 352 P.2d 83, 85 (1960).
37. See Flemmer v. Ming, - Mont. -, 621 P.2d 1038, 1042 (1980); Gallatin Natural
Gas Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 79 Mont. 269, 281-82, 256 P. 373, 376 (1927); Hansen
Sheep Co. v. Farmers' & Traders' State Bank, 53 Mont. 324, 333, 163 P. 1151, 1153 (1917).
38. See Scott v. Prescott, 69 Mont. 540, 553, 223 P. 490, 494 (1924).
39. See Shaffer v. Buxbaum, 137 Mont. 397, 401, 352 P.2d 83, 85 (1960) (where paid in
capital was $300, while existing debts were $5,948.77); Commercial Credit Co. v. O'Brien,
115 Mont. 199, 203, 146 P.2d 637, 639 (1944) (where paid in capital was $11,174.17 compared to the total assigned receivables of $183,481,689.92).
40. Wilson v. Milner Motels, Inc., 116 Mont. 424, 427, 154 P.2d 265, 267 (1944); Commercial Credit Co. v. O'Brien, 115 Mont. 199, 203, 146 P.2d 637, 639 (1944).
41. Wilson v. Milner Hotels, Inc., 116 Mont. 424, 428, 154 P.2d 265, 267 (1944).
42. Flemmer v. Ming, - Mont. -, 621 P.2d 1038, 1042 (1980); State ex rel. Monarch
Fire Ins. Co. v. Holmes, 113 Mont. 303, 308, 124 P.2d 994, 996 (1942).
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disregarded the corporate entity where the corporation has been
used fraudulently or illegally to avoid a contractual obligation, to
collect an inequitable obligation, to circumvent a regulatory statute, to evade taxes, to avoid a common law duty, and to defeat a
partner's interest.
a. Avoiding Contractual Obligations
The corporate entity is most commonly disregarded where the
corporation is being used fraudulently or in bad faith to avoid a
contractual obligation. In Wilson v. Milner Hotels, Inc.4" the court
pierced a corporate veil to prevent a corporation from being used
in a fraudulent scheme to deprive the plaintiffs of money owed
them under a lease. After obtaining a lease for plaintiffs' motel, the
defendant, a Delaware corporation, attempted to escape liability
by assigning the lease to the defendant's insolvent Montana subsidiary. The court found the subsidiary to be a mere shell without
substance and thus held the parent corporation liable under the
-lease. 4
Similarly, a corporation cannot be used to defraud persons of
money owed them under a promissory note. For example, in Flemmer v. Ming," the plaintiffs had agreed to sell their motel on a
contract for deed to the defendant, Ming. During the negotiations
regarding the sale and subsequent default, each contract, promissory note, check or letter sent by Ming was in the name of one of
three different corporations and signed by Ming as president. In
plaintiffs' action to recover the unpaid balance of the promissory
note, Ming denied personal liability. He claimed that he was
merely a shareholder of the corporation that had purchased the
motel. The evidence supported the trial court's finding that the
corporations were in reality the "alter ego" of Ming 4s and were being used to defraud the plaintiffs. Thus, the court pierced the cor43. 116 Mont. 424, 154 P.2d 265 (1944).
44. Id. at 432, 154 P.2d at 269. The court relied upon the following facts to uphold the
trial court's finding that the Montana subsidiary was a mere shell without a substance: both
corporations had the same officers; despite the assignment, no change took place in the
management of the hotel; the subsidiary did not have a separate bank account but received
a draft daily from the parent's head office; the subsidiary owned no property; and the subsidiary's annual statements were prepared at the parent's head office.
45. - Mont. -, 621 P.2d 1038 (1980).
46. Id. at _, 621 P.2d at 1042. The evidence showed the following: the three corporations were closely held, family corporations; the officers, shareholders and directors of each
corporation were members of Ming's family; the registered office of all three corporations
was Ming's personal residence; all three corporations and Ming were engaged in the same
business-selling real estate; and Ming admitted at trial his unity of interest with one of the
corporations.
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porate veils and held Ming personally liable for the debt. 47 Flemmer v. Ming also illustrates the advantage to the plaintiff who
establishes fraud in piercing the corporate veil: where there is substantial evidence of fraud, the jury may award punitive, as well as
actual, damages.4 8
A finding that a corporation is attempting to escape a just obligation by fraudulent means is not an absolute requirement to
hold the shareholder personally liable. In Stromberg v. Seaton
Ranch Co., 49 the court held that bad faith, absent a positive showing of fraud, was sufficient basis to pierce the corporate veil. The
plaintiff, a broker, had interested a potential buyer in purchasing a
ranch owned by Seaton Ranch Company. After telling the broker
to "forget it for now," the corporation and the buyer secretly completed negotiations.5 0 The court affirmed the trial court's decision
that the broker was entitled to a commission. Furthermore, the
court stated that Mrs. Seaton was the alter ego of the corporation
by reason of her ownership of the entire beneficial interest in the
corporation. Relying on Seaton's alter ego status and Seaton's bad
faith in excluding the broker from final negotiations, the court
pierced the corporate veil. Accordingly, Seaton was held personally
liable for payment of the commission."
The court also pierced the corporate veil to preclude an individual from using a corporate entity to avoid payment of a personal debt in Hansen Sheep Co. v. Farmers' & Traders' State
Bank.52 The plaintiff, an alleged corporation, had on deposit certain funds with the defendant bank. Upon the oral authorization of
Hansen, the president of the corporation, the bank applied those
funds to discharge a personal note in Hansen's name. When Hansen later learned that the corporation had no intention of extending him further credit, he attempted to regain the funds. As
president of the corporation, Hansen brought an action against the
bank. Hansen claimed that the application of corporate funds was
done illegally because the bank did not have the authorization of
the corporation's other director, namely, Hansen's wife. The court
concluded that the authorization of Hansen's wife was unnecessary. Because Hansen owned virtually all of the corporation's
stock, completely controlled the activities of the corporation, and
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at -, 621 P.2d at 1043.
Id.
160 Mont. 293, 502 P.2d 41 (1972).
Id. at 299, 502 P.2d at 44.
Id. at 309, 502 P.2d at 49-50.
53 Mont. 324, 163 P. 1151 (1917).
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used the corporation to serve his own purposes, the court pierced
the corporate veil to preclude Hansen from using the corporate entity to avoid the debt." The court concluded that Hansen's authorization to the bank to apply the deposit as he did amounted to no
more than a payment of his personal obligation with monies belonging to him." Accordingly, the court denied relief to the alleged
corporation."
b.

Collecting on Inequitable Obligations

The Montana Supreme Court will also pierce the corporate
veil to preclude an individual from requiring performance under an
inequitable contract. In Barnes v. Smith,"' the plaintiff was the
sole owner of a corporation. The plaintiff induced two of the corporate directors to endorse as guarantors a note executed and delivered by the corporation to a bank. After the proceeds of the note
had been used by the corporation, the plaintiff paid the note and
then brought suit against the directors to recover on their contract
of guaranty. The court held that one who owns all the stock of a
corporation and uses the corporate machinery for his own purposes, even though acting in good faith, is estopped from denying
its corporate capacity.6 7 Thus, considering the manifest inequity of
plaintiff's position, the court looked behind the corporate veil and
held that plaintiff could not recover.58
The court also pierced a corporate veil to preclude the plaintiff from recovering under an inequitable contract in Shaffer v.
Buxbaum,6 9 where a family devised a unique scheme to defraud
innocent parties. The plaintiff was a carpenter who worked for a
corporation owned entirely by his family. Plaintiff's son, representing the corporation, grossly underbid construction contracts. When
the corporation was awarded the contract, the plaintiff deposited
the down payment in his personal account and then charged all
building materials to the corporation. The unsuspecting defendant
53. Id. at 338-39, 163 P. at 1155.
54. The holding in Hansen appears to be an exception to the general rule that an
officer of a corporation cannot use the corporate funds to pay his personal obligations. For a
similar holding see United States Gypsum Co. v. Mackey Wall Plaster Co., 60 Mont. 132,
143, 199 P. 249, 251 (1921) (where the court held that the controlling shareholders "had the
right to use corporate funds to pay their personal obligations, for they were the
corporation").
55. Id.
56. 48 Mont. 309, 137 P. 541 (1913).
57. Id. at 319, 137 P. at 544.
58. Id. at 319-20, 137 P. at 544.
59. 137 Mont. 397, 352 P.2d 83 (1960).
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was later forced to pay for the materials to avoid the filing of
mechanics' liens against his property. The plaintiff then filed an
action against both his family's insolvent corporation and the defendant to foreclose on the plaintiff's own mechanic's lien for his
labor. Relying on the family's ownership, of the corporation and the
obvious use of the corporation to defraud the defendant, the court
pierced the corporate veil.6 0 The construction contract was held to
be in fact the contract of the plaintiff and not of the sham corporation."1 Thus, the plaintiff was denied recovery.
c.

Circumventing Regulatory Statutes

The Montana Supreme Court also refuses to distinguish between a corporation and its shareholders where the corporation is
being used to avoid compliance with a statutory requirement. The
court will look beyond the corporate form to require the shareholders to comply with a statute where it is in fact the shareholders
and not the corporation to whom the statute applies. Thus, the
2
court in GallatinNatural Gas Co. v. Public Service Commission,
held that a parent corporation that delivered gas to Montana residents could not escape registering with the Public Service Commission merely by creating and registering a subsidiary
corporation."3
In Board of Railroad Commissioners v. Reed," the court was
requested to pierce the veil of an association" and to hold its
members subject to the regulatory power of the Board of Railroad
Commissioners. The defendant claimed that he was not subject to
the control of the Board because he did not transport merchandise
for hire over public highways. Rather, he claimed that he was simply an employee of a "voluntary association of business members
banded together to handle the shipping of goods of the members of
the association only."66 The court acknowledged that the evidence
warranted a finding that the creation of the association was a mere
60. Id. at 402, 352 P.2d at 85-86.
61. Id.
62. 79 Mont. 269, 256 P. 373 (1927).
63. Based on the following facts, the court concluded that the subsidiary corporation
was a mere instrumentality of the parent corporation: the parent and its directors owned all
of the stock of the subsidiary; the subsidiary's books were kept at the parent's head office;
and the attorney and vice president of the subsidiary admitted that the parent and subsidiary were the same entity. Id. at 281-82, 256 P. at 376.
64. 102 Mont. 382, 58 P.2d 271 (1936).
65. Montana has extended the doctrine of "piercing the veil" beyond the corporate
structure to an association where individuals were attempting to circumvent a regulatory
statute by forming a sham entity.
66. Id. at 384, 58 P.2d at 271.
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subterfuge to evade the law. The court, however, held that it could
not declare the association to be a sham because the association
had not been joined as a party defendant. 7
Finally, in State ex rel. Monarch Fire Insurance Co. v.
Holmes," the Montana court indicated in dicta that it would go
behind the separate corporate entity to preclude a parent whose
license has been revoked from continuing to operate illegally in
Montana through its licensed subsidiary. The court held, however,
that for two reasons such a holding was not warranted in the present case. First, there was no showing that the parent corporation
was in fact operating the subsidiary's business directly for itself.
Second, since the subsidiary had been created long before the revocation of the parent's license, the court refused to hold that the
subsidiary was created as a means to circumvent the revocation.6
d. Evading Taxes
The Montana Supreme Court will also not permit corporate
shareholders to evade taxes through the use of a sham corporate
structure. This principle is illustrated in Commercial Credit Co. v.
O'Brien10 The plaintiff, a Montana corporation doing business in
Montana, assigned all of its assets to its sole shareholder, a Delaware corporation. Plaintiff claimed that it no longer owned the assets and thus could not be taxed on them. Plaintiff further claimed
that its parent corporation did not do business in Montana and
thus also could not be taxed on the assets. The court stated that
the evidence supported a finding that the subsidiary was merely
the alter ego of the Delaware corporation.7 1 Furthermore, the Delaware corporation had continuously used Montana state and county
offices and courts in the conduct of its business. Thus, for policy as
well as legal reasons, the court held that the Delaware
corporation
7 2
could not escape taxation on the assets in Montana.
67. Id. at 385-86, 58 P.2d at 272-73.
68. 113 Mont. 303, 309, 124 P.2d 994, 997 (1942).
69. Id. at 308-09, 124 P.2d at 996-97.
70. 115 Mont. 199, 146 P.2d 639 (1944).
71. Id. at 211, 146 P.2d at 642-43. The court relied upon the following facts in concluding that the subsidiary was the alter ego of the parent corporation: both parent and
subsidiary had the same names; the parent owned all of the stock of the subsidiary; the

parent controlled, dominated and directed all affairs of the subsidiary; the parent and subsidiary were engaged in the same business; despite the assignment of accounts receivable,
the subsidiary continued to receive collections; when an account was fully paid, the subsidi-

ary and not the parent delivered the note to the dealer; the subsidiary reserved title to the
secured property until the note was fully paid; and the original contracts were located in

Montana and not at the parent's head office.
72.

Id. at 219, 146 P.2d at 646.
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e.

Avoiding Common Law Duties

The Montana Supreme Court also refuses to permit a corporation to be used to avoid common law duties owed to certain parties. This principle is illustrated in Reynolds v. Burlington Northern, Inc. 7 3 The plaintiff, an employee of Ksanka Lumber Company,
was injured when a string of Burlington Northern's railroad cars
struck a cable over which the plaintiff was straddled. Ksanka was a
wholly-owned subsidiary of Plum Creek Lumber Company, which
was in turn a wholly-owned subsidiary of the railroad. The plaintiff
sued the railroad, alleging that the railroad had breached its common law duty to provide its employees with a safe place to work.
The railroad denied that it owed plaintiff such a duty because
plaintiff was not its employee. The court, however, refused to ignore the "real relationship" between Ksanka and the railroad. Apparently because of the railroad's ownership, the court concluded
that both Ksanka and Plum Creek were the alter egos of the railroad company. 7 The court further noted that at the time of the
injury, plaintiff was performing work more directly connected to
the operations of a railroad than to the operations of a lumber
company. The court held that the railroad corporation could not,
by creating a wholly-owned subsidiary, "absolve itself of its responsibility to provide a safe place to work for employees who are
technically employed by a subsidiary corporation, but whose employment is directly related to the operations of a railroad."' 75
f.

Defeating a Partner'sInterest

The Montana Supreme Court will also pierce the corporate
veil to preclude an individual from using the corporate device to
defeat his partner's interest in a partnership. This principle is illustrated in Scott v. Prescott,7 where an action was brought for a
partnership accounting. Scott and Prescott had been engaged in a
ranching partnership before Prescott attempted to form a corporation. While Prescott was a very experienced businessman, Scott
lacked financial experience and was wholly unfamiliar with the significance of a corporation. Prescott told Scott that the corporation
was "just a matter of form; that it was to work no change in their
partnership affairs."' 77 Prescott handled the incorporation. He is73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Mont. -, 621 P.2d 1028 (1980)..
Id. at -, 621 P.2d at 1038.
Id.
69 Mont. 540, 223 P. 490 (1924).
Id. at 550, 223 P. at 493.
-
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sued all of the stock to himself, with the exception of two shares
that went to members of his family. Scott was neither a shareholder, officer, nor director. The business continued for ten years
until Scott demanded, and Prescott refused, delivery of stock certificates to Scott. On the facts,7 8 the court concluded that the corporation had never even come into existence.7

Its only function

was to serve as a pseudonym under which the partnership business
was conducted. Accordingly, the court held Prescott liable for
Scott's interest in the partnership.O
2. Policy Considerations
In summary, if the court finds that a corporation is merely the
alter ego or agent of its shareholders and that the corporation is
being used for some fraudulent or illegal purpose, the court will
generally pierce the corporate veil. Even in cases where the corporation is not being used for a fraudulent or illegal purpose, the
court has shown a willingness to pierce the veil if certain underlying policy considerations are present.
As a matter of policy, the court may decide to pierce a corporate veil after considering the equities involved in bearing the risk
of loss. This consideration is illustrated in State ex rel. Foot v.
Farmers' & Mechanics' State Bank of Helena,"' a case involving
the bankruptcy proceeding of a bank. The bank became insolvent
due to embezzlement by a cashier. The cashier was also the business manager of a corporation that was owned entirely by his wife.
The issue was whether the corporation could recover funds deposited in the bank. The court pierced the corporate veil and held
that the cashier's wife and the corporation were one and the
same.8' The court disallowed the claim, stating that in light of the
lack of attention given by the wife to her corporation, it appeared
"more equitable that [the wife of the embezzling cashier] should
suffer loss than to impose additional burdens upon the depositors
and directors of the looted bank."83
78. The court relied upon the following facts: the corporation failed to hold any shareholder meetings beyond the incorporation stage; net profits of the business were distributed
more like partnership profits than dividends; the corporation did not have a separate bank
account; the corporation's funds were commingled with Prescott's personal funds; the books
containing the financial records of the business were headed by Prescott's name; and Prescott frequently referred to Scott as his partner.
79. Id. at 561, 223 P. at 497.
80. Id. at 562-63, 223 P. at 497-98.
81. 85 Mont. 256, 278 P. 828 (1929).
82. Id. at 264, 278 P. at 831.
83. Id.
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The court may also pierce a corporate veil where it is necessary to justify a prevention of needless loss. Thus, in Russell v.
Russell,8" the court disregarded the corporate entity to credit an
executrix for her payment of corporate debts with estate funds. Ordinarily, the debts of a corporation would not constitute proper
claims against the estate of the decedent even where, as here, the
estate consisted entirely of the stock in the corporations. The
court, however, reasoned that if the executrix had treated the two
corporations and the estate as separate entities, she would have
been unable to pay the corporations' debts. 85 Failure to pay the
debts would have resulted in seizure of the corporations' property,
and the estate would have been entirely lost. "It would indeed be a
harsh rule that would penalize the executrix for attempting to prevent such a loss." 6
Other policy considerations which influence the court's decision of whether to pierce the corporate veil include a disparity in
the sophistication of the parties regarding the significance of the
corporate entity, 7 the existence of a fiduciary relationship between
the corporation and the plaintiff,88 and the necessity of a governmental imposition, such as taxation. 9
IV. THE UNPIERCEABLE VEIL
Sun River Stock & Land Co. v. Montana Trust & Savings
Bank90 illustrates that it is possible to establish and operate a corporation so as to avoid having the corporate veil pierced. In Sun
River, two partners, Burke and Power, incorporated their livestock
business as Rock Creek Ranch Company. Articles of incorporation
were filed, directors and officers were elected, bylaws were adopted,
meetings of the shareholders and directors were held, stock was
issued, a corporate bank account was opened, all title to the corporation's property was in the corporation's name, and corporate in84. 102 Mont. 301, 59 P.2d 777 (1936).
85. Id. at 309-10, 59 P.2d at 781.
86. Id. at 310, 59 P.2d at 781.
87. See, e.g., Flemmer v. Ming, - Mont. -, 621 P.2d 1038, 1040 (1980) (where the
court was influenced by the plaintiff's testimony that the designation "Inc." after the defendant's name on the contract had held no special significance to~either her or her husband).
See also Scott v. Prescott, 69 Mont. 540, 547, 223 P. 490, 492 (1924).
88. See Flemmer v. Ming, - Mont. -, 621 P.2d 1038, 1043 (1980) (real estate salesman); State v. Hall, 45 Mont. 498, 502, 125 P. 639, 642 (1912) (attorney).
89. See, e.g., Commercial Credit Co. v. O'Brien, 115 Mont. 199, 215-16, 146 P.2d 637,
645 (1944) (where the court stressed the necessity of collecting taxes to enable the government to function).
90. 81 Mont. 222, 262 P. 1039 (1928).
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come tax returns were filed."' Burke and Power borrowed funds for
the corporation from several sources. Notes were given in the corporation's name and were personally endorsed by Burke and
Power. When Burke died soon thereafter, the corporation was insolvent. Power, as president of a separate corporation that had
loaned money to Rock Creek, brought action against Burke's estate
for one-half of the outstanding balance on the note.9 2 Power
claimed that Rock Creek was not a bona fide corporation because
of noncompliance with a statute requiring that each director also
be a shareholder. Power contended that since one of the directors
had not actually paid any consideration for his shares, he was not a
qualified director. Thus Power claimed that Rock Creek was really
a partnership and that Burke's estate was liable for one-half of the
note. The court held that Power was estopped to deny the corporation's existence because he had recognized the legal entity in the
past.as Furthermore, because Rock Creek "bore the similitude of a
corporation in every way,"' and because there was no hint of
fraud, inequity or injustice, the court concluded that there was no
reason to look behind the corporate veil. Accordingly, Burke's estate was not held liable for the insolvent corporation's debts.
V.

THE CONFUSION OF CORPORATE VEIL LAW WITH AGENCY LAW

The doctrine of piercing the corporate veil and agency law are
two distinct legal theories. Recall that corporate veil cases are concerned with whether the shareholders of a corporation should be
held personally liable for acts of the corporation. 5 The fact that
the shareholder is also an agent, such as a director or officer, of the
corporation is only important as one of many different factors that
may indicate that the corporation is the alter ego of the shareholders.as Agency law, on the other hand, is concerned with the relationship between the corporation and its agents, namely, the direc91. Id. at 226-27, 262 P. at 1041.
92. Id. at 231, 262 P. at 1042.
93. Id. at 240, 262 P. at 1046. This language in Sun River suggests that where the
court does not find the evidence sufficient to warrant piercing the corporate veil, the court
disposes of the case by holding that the party who advocates the piercing is in substance
challenging the existence of the corporation. For a similar holding, see also Dunham v. Natural Bridge Ranch Co., 115 Mont. 579, 585, 147 P.2d 902, 905 (1944).
94. Id. at 238, 262 P. at 1045.
95. See supra text accompanying notes 4-10; contra Little v. Grizzly Mfg., - Mont. _,
636 P.2d 839, 842 (1981) (where the court stated in very loose and misleading language that
"[iun Montana, officers of a corporation have been held personally liable where it was shown
that the corporation was merely an 'alter ego' for a person using a shield for purposes of
fraud"). (emphasis added).
96. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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tors, officers, and employees of the corporation. The fact that an
agent is also a shareholder is immaterial.
The Montana Supreme Court confuses the doctrine of piercing
the corporate veil with agency law principles. There are two areas
where this confusion arises: the determination of a corporation's
liability on contracts executed by its agent and the determination
of a corporate agent's liability for his own criminal and tortious
acts.
A.

The Corporation'sLiability for Contracts
Executed by Its Agent

The Montana Supreme Court confuses corporate veil law with
agency law when deciding whether a corporation is liable for a contract executed on behalf of the corporation by its president. In Edwards v. Plains Light & Water Co. 97 the Montana Supreme Court
held that a corporation could not avoid an employment contract by
claiming that the president had lacked the necessary authority to
hire the plaintiff. 8 After superficially discussing agency law, the
court disposed of the case by applying corporate veil law. 9 The
court noted that the president owned 497 of the corporation's 500
shares of stock. Moreover, the president had complete and exclusive control over the operations of the corporation. The court
stated that:
[T]he corporate entity, as distinguished from [the president] in
his capacity of agent, is to be ignored, and when he executes such
a contract as that under consideration here, it must be regarded
as much that of the company as if it had been authorized in the
most formal manner.100
Thus, the court concluded that under the circumstances, any action by the president was for all intents and purposes the action of
the corporation.
The court only confused matters by attempting to apply the
doctrine of piercing the corporate veil. A corporate veil is pierced
to impose the legal consequences of a corporation's act directly
upon the shareholders. 10 1 Edwards did not involve the issue of
whether the shareholders were liable for acts of the corporation.
Rather, the issue was whether the corporation was liable for an act
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

49 Mont. 535, 143 P. 962 (1914).
Id. at 545, 143 P. at 964-65.
Id. at 547-48, 143 P. at 965.
Id.
See supra text accompanying note 6.
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of its agent. This issue is an agency issue, and the court should
have applied only agency law. Under agency law, a corporation, as
a principal, is bound by all contracts made in its behalf by an
agent authorized to make such contracts. 102 The position of president carries with it the implied authority to perform the acts necessary to carry on the ordinary business of the corporation.1 03 Since
the ordinary business of this particular corporation required the
hiring of employees, the corporation was bound by the employment contract executed by the president.
B.

The Corporate Agent's Liability for His Criminal and
Tortious Acts

The Montana Supreme Court also confuses corporate veil law
with agency law when deciding whether a corporate agent can be
held personally liable for his crimes or torts committed while acting in his capacity as agent. In State v. Hal10 4 and State v. Holdren10 5 the court stated that it was piercing the corporate veil to
preclude an individual from escaping responsibility for his criminal
acts. In both cases, the court upheld the conviction of the defendant for embezzling funds while acting as the president of a collection agency.' 0 0
The principle set forth in Hall and Holdren is laudable: the
corporate entity should not be the basis for avoiding criminal liability where the individual is personally responsible for the crime.
But the court only confused matters by talking in terms of "piercing the corporate veil." As a general rule, an individual is always
subject to liability for his own criminal conduct. 01 The fact that
the individual is an agent of a corporation cannot be used to ab102. MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-10-601 (1981) provides that "[ain agent represents his
principal for all purposes within the scope of his actual or ostensible authority, and all the
rights and liabilities which would accrue to the agent from transactions within such limit, if
they had been entered into on his own account, accrue to the principal." MONT.CODE ANN. §

28-10-603 (1981) adds that "[a]n instrument within the scope of his authority by which an
agent intends to bind his principle does bind him .. " See generally Wyse, A Framework
of Analysis for the Law of Agency, 40 MONT.L. REV. 47 (1979).
103. Edwards, 49 Mont. at 545, 143 P. at 964.
104. 45 Mont. 498, 125 P. 639 (1912).
105. 143 Mont. 103, 387 P.2d 446 (1963).
106. In both Hall and Holdren the court relied upon the following facts to pierce the
veil and hold the president liable for embezzling: the president owned all of the corporation's stock, the president used corporate funds for personal expenditures, and the president
had sole control over the books and the bank account.
107. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-301 (1981) provides that a "person is responsible for
conduct which is an element of an offense if the conduct is ... that of the person himself
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109

solve the individual from liability. 108
The Montana Supreme Court's confusion of agency law with
corporate veil law in a torts issue is apparent from Phillips v. The
Montana Education Association, 9 a case involving an action for
wrongful termination of employment. The parties did not dispute
the fact that Phillips had a cause of action against the corporation
for alleged breach of contract. 110 The question was whether the
agents of the corporation, namely the officers, directors and employees, could be held individually liable for the tort of maliciously
induced breach of employment contract. The court balanced public
policy considerations and set forth the following rules: "Where an
officer or director acts against the best interests of the corporation,
acts for his own pecuniary benefit, or with the interest to harm the
plaintiff, he is personally liable." '' The court concluded, however,
that the "privilege of limited liability 12 should be applicable in
those situations where actions are motivated and taken in the furtherance of corporate purposes, policies and interests.1'" s Thus,
since the plaintiff failed to show that the actions taken by the individual defendants were not taken in furtherance of corporate interests, the court applied the privilege of limited liability to shield the
4
individual defendants from personal liability."
The court in Phillips reached the correct result, but its appli108. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-312(1) (1981) provides that a "person is legally accountable for conduct which is an element of an offense and which, in the name or in behalf of a
corporation, he performs or causes to be performed to the same extent as if the conduct
were performed in his own name or behalf." The annotator's note states: "The purpose of
the statute is to prevent an offender from insulating himself from criminal liability by performing acts through a corporation .
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-312 annotator's note
(1981).
109.

-

Mont.

-,

610 P.2d 154 (1980).

110. As indicated in the discussion of the Edwards case, see supra notes 97-103 and
accompanying text, a corporation, as a principal, is bound by all contracts made in its behalf
by an agent authorized to make such contracts. The agent, however, is not personally liable
under the contract unless (1) he manifests his consent to be bound, (2) he enters into the
contract without believing in good faith that he has the authority to do so, or (3) his acts are
wrongful. MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-10-702 (1981). Since none of these conditions were present
in Phillips, the court correctly held that only the corporation was liable for breach of the
employment contract, and that the agents of the corporation were not liable.
111.

Phillips, - Mont.

-,

610 P.2d at 158.

112. The court's discussion of "limited liability" in the context of a corporate director
is confusing. Recall that corporate shareholders enjoy limited liability, which is personal
liability for acts of the corporation limited to the amount paid for their stock. See supra
text accompanying note 3. Since directors, and particularly directors of the Montana Education Association, do not necessarily own stock in the corporation, it is improper to talk of
limiting their liability to the amounts paid for their stock. "Absolute liability" would have
been a more appropriate term.
113.

Id. at -, 610 P.2d at 158.

114.

Id.
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cation of corporate veil law, rather than agency law, was improper
and served only to confuse the court's reasoning. Just as an agent
is always personally liable for the crimes he commits, he is also
. personally liable for the torts he commits." 6 The agent cannot escape liability for his torts by shielding himself behind his principal." 6 Thus, in Phillips, the officers and directors could be held
individually liable for the tort of maliciously induced breach of employment contract, but only if the plaintiff could show that the
defendants maliciously induced the corporation's refusal to perform."' The district court found that the actions taken by the defendants were not done with malice. 1 8 Thus, although the court
applied the wrong legal theory, its holding that the agents were not
personally liable for the tort is correct.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The corporate form of business has greatly encouraged trade
and industry in Montana as well as the rest of the nation. ' 9 Limited liability of shareholders has contributed largely to that economic development. Nonetheless, the injustice that can result from
improper uses of the corporate device cannot be ignored. The doctrine of "piercing the corporate veil" recognizes both the policies
fostering protection of shareholders and the equities favoring those
who have been harmed by improper use of the corporate device. 120
Realistically, it is difficult to predict with absolute certainty the
likelihood for success in piercing a corporate veil. Due to the equitable nature of the doctrine, each case must be decided on the basis of its unique facts. But while the circumstances vary with the
facts of each case, it is reasonably safe to predict that where a
shareholder dominates a corporation so completely that he be115. See generally W. SEAvEY, AGENCY § 132 (1964). MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-10-702
(1981) provides that "an agent is responsible to third persons ... for his acts in the course
of his agency ... (3) when his acts are wrongful in their nature."
116. The existence of an agency relationship expands, rather than limits, liability in a
tort situation. Through invocation of vicarious liability, the principal can also be held liable
for the tort of its agent if the agent was acting within the scope of his employment when the
tort was committed. MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-10-602(1) (1981) provides that "a principal is
responsible to third persons for the negligence of his agent in the transaction of the business
of the agency, including wrongful acts committed by such agent ....
"
117. The court set forth the prima facie case for the tort of malicious inducement of
breach of contract. The plaintiff must show "(1) that a contract was entered into, (2) that its
performance was refused, (3) that such refusal was induced by the unlawful and malicious
acts of the defendant, and (4) that damages have resulted to the plaintiff." (emphasis added) Phillips,- Mont. at -, 610 P.2d at 157.
118. Id. at -, 610 P.2d at 158.
119. See generally H. BALLENTINE, CORPORATIONS § 1 (rev. ed. 1946).
120. Note, Disregard of the CorporateEntity, 4 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 369 (1978).
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111

comes the corporation itself, the Montana court will pierce the corporate veil where necessary to prevent fraud or achieve equity.
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